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If you would like to receive our newsletter on a regular basis, please follow this link. ----------------- JOURNAL OF POPULATION ECONOMICS ----------------- Newsletter 2/2008 * Edited at IZA, Bonn, Germany (address see below) * Editor-in-chief: Klaus F. Zimmermann * For correspondence, please use: popecon@iza.org ------------------------------------------------------------ Contents: 1) Free Paper Download 2) Abstracts of Volume 21, Number 2, 2008 3) Content of Volume 21, 2008 4) About the Journal of Population Economics 5) Editorial Board For additional information (e.g. instructions for authors,information about last issues) please visit our homepage at: http://www.popecon.org ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------------------- 1) Free Paper Download --------------------------- "Unemployment and consumption near and far away from the Mediterranean" BENTOLILA, Samuel ICHINO, Andrea J Popul Econ (2008) 21:255-280 Download from: http://www.popecon.org/download/bentolila_ichino_02212008.pd f --------------------------- 2) Abstracts of Volume 21, Number 2, 2008 --------------------------- --- INTRA-HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATIONS "Unemployment and consumption near and far away from the Mediterranean" BENTOLILA, Samuel Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI), Spain e-mail: bentolila@cemfi.es ICHINO, Andrea University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy e-mail: andrea.ichino@unibo.it Abstract. We study the insurance mechanisms employed by households to absorb unemployment shocks using comparable data for four countries: Italy, Spain, Great Britain, and the US. Results on family transfers when the male household head becomes unemployed suggest that family networks are the weakest in Britain, while unemployment benefits there are instead the most generous across the four countries. Despite these differences, food consumption losses induced by unemployment of the male household head are similar across countries. These findings are consistent with the view that family support and the Welfare State substitute each other in mitigating the consequences of unemployment shocks. "The wage gap and the leisure gap for double-earner couples" BEBLO, Miriam FHW Berlin School of Economics, Berlin, Germany e-mail: beblo@fhw-berlin.de ROBLEDO, Julio R. Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria e-mail: julio.robledo@univie.ac.at Abstract. Empirical research has consistently shown that, on average, men are paid higher wages than women. Moreover, men enjoy more leisure time than women. We develop a noncooperative model of the private provision of family public goods to analyze whether the wage gap and the leisure gap are related. Simultaneous and sequential decision-making structures within a couple lead to different empirical hypotheses. Our estimates based on the German Socio-Economic Panel data show that husbands enjoy, other things equal, more leisure time than their wives. This advantage can be explained if the husband is the Stackelberg leader in a sequential private provision game. "Gender discrimination and efficiency in marriage: the bargaining family under scrutiny" RAINER, Helmut School of Economics and Finance, St Salvator’s College, University of St Andrews, UK e-mail: hr11@st-andrews.ac.uk Abstract. We consider a repeated family bargaining model that links the topics of employment and households. A key aspect of the model is that marital bargaining power is determined endogenously. We show that: (1) the efficiency of household decisions is sometimes inversely related to the prevailing degree of gender discrimination in labor markets; (2) women who are discriminated against have difficulty enforcing cooperative household outcomes because they may be extremely limited to credibly punish opportunistic behavior by their male partners; (3) the likelihood that sharing rules such as 'equal sharing' are maintained throughout a marriage relationship is highest when men and women face equal opportunities in labor markets. "Social security and conflict within the family" GLAZER, Amihai Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine, USA e-mail:aglazer@uci.edu Abstract. A husband and wife, though benefitting from marriage, may yet misappropriate some of the spouse's assets rather than let all be saved. In a Nash equilibrium, family savings may therefore be lower than what each spouse would prefer. Social Security, which is a form of forced, secure saving, can therefore increase welfare. "Normative evaluation of tax policies: from households to individuals" BARGAIN, Olivier IZA, Bonn, Germany e-mail: bargain@iza.org Abstract. We simulate a hypothetical family tax credit on a sample of French couples, using jointly a collective model of labor supply and a tax-benefit calculator. Work behaviors represent here a general concept of 'effort,' and hence, individual productivities cannot be assimilated with wage rates. They are retrieved by inversion of the optimal household program under simple assumptions on household preferences and bargaining rules. The calibrated model is used to predict incentive effects of the reform and distributive impacts on individuals and households. The desirability of the reform depends on which of these two welfare units is used for normative evaluation. "Household structure and consumption insurance of the elderly" ULKER, Aydogan Economics Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Australia e-mail: aulker@coombs.anu.edu.au Abstract. This paper examines the role of household formation in providing consumption insurance to the elderly. Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Surveys, raw tabulations of per adult equivalent consumption indicate that the elderly who live alone have higher levels of well- being relative to those who live with others. This is misleading, however, because the decision to live alone is clearly endogenous. The empirical estimation accounts for this endogeneity using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The results provide evidence that household formation plays a significant role in maintaining consumption levels. Without the opportunity to live with others, the welfare gap measured by the difference between per adult equivalent consumption levels of dependent and independent livers would be even larger. These findings suggest that co-residing with others effectively supplements social security, pensions, and private savings and helps the elderly to smooth consumption in old age. --- DIVORCE "Do children stabilize relationships in Denmark?" SVARER, Michael Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, Denmark e-mail: msvarer@econ.au.dk VERNER, Mette Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics, Denmark e-mail: mve@asb.dk Abstract. In this paper, we study the relationship between fertility behavior and the process of relationship duration. The potential endogeneity of fertility on dissolution risk is taken into account by modeling fertility and dissolution jointly. We apply the timing-of-event method (Abbring and van den Berg, Econometrica 71(5):1491-1517, 2003) to identify the causal effect of births on the dissolution hazard. We show that couples who are less prone to split up are more prone to invest in children, and therefore, one might (mistakenly) conclude that children stabilize relationships. However, when correcting for the selectivity bias arising from the fertility decision, we conclude that children themselves have a negative effect on relationship duration. "Public transfers and marital dissolution" TJOTTA, Sigve Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway e-mail: sigve.tjotta@econ.uib.no VAAGE, Kjell Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway e-mail: Kjell.Vaage@econ.uib.no Abstract. In this paper, we analyze determinants of marital dissolution, focusing on the alleged influences from public transfers, child allowance, and child support awards. We use a Norwegian panel of 2,806 couples with information on public and private transfers in cases of divorce. The sample was observed over a 5-year period, with the purpose of registering marital dissolution. We find that the level of transfers has a significantly positive effect on divorce probability and that the distribution of transfers in favor of the wife increases this probability. Our findings are consistent with noncooperative family models allowing for inefficient outcomes. "Income effects of divorce in families with dependent children" BRATBERG, Espen Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway e-mail: espen.bratberg@econ.uib.no TJOTTA, Sigve Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway e-mail: sigve.tjotta@econ.uib.no Abstract. The Norwegian post-divorce transfer scheme for families with children guarantees minimum maintenance payments from the non-custodial to the custodial parent. We studied the economic effects of divorce in such families. When the mother has custody, she falls behind before maintenance payments. After adding these, the outcomes at the median are very similar for both parents, contrasting studies from other countries, but the risk of a drop in equivalized income is large. "Age at marriage and marital instability: revisiting the Becker-Landes-Michael hypothesis" LEHRER, Evelyn L. Economics Department (m/c 144), University of Illinois at Chicago, USA e-mail: elehrer@uic.edu Abstract. An early age at first marriage is known to be associated with a high risk of divorce. Yet, it has been suggested that beyond a certain point, the relationship between age at marriage and marital instability may become positive because as unmarried women begin to hear their biological clock tick, they may settle for matches far from the optimal. Analyses based on cycles 5 and 6 of the National Surveys of Family Growth show that the relationship between age at marriage and marital instability is strongly negative up to the late 20s, with a flattening of the curve thereafter. "Divorce law and family formation" DREWIANKA, Scott Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, USA e-mail: sdrewian@uwm.edu Abstract. Several studies have investigated whether unilateral divorce laws raised divorce rates, with mixed results. This paper asks whether unilateral, and no-fault, divorce laws influenced family formation. Besides their interest to policy makers, such effects may help theorists understand the mechanisms through which laws affect behavior. The results suggest that no-fault laws slightly reduced fertility, and unilateral divorce modestly increased divorce and legitimacy. However, the pattern of effects is not consistent with any of the hypotheses reviewed, and the estimated magnitudes suggest that changes in divorce law were not a major cause of changing family structure. --------------------------- 3) Content of Volume 21, 2008 --------------------------- ----------------- Issue 1, 2008 --------------------- "The new economics of education: methods, evidence and policy" MACHIN, Stephen "The changing nature of wage inequality" LEMIEUX, Thomas --- FERTILITY "Social aspirations and choice of fertility: why can status motive reduce per-capita growth?" TOURNEMAINE, Frederic "Planned fertility and family background: a quantile regression for counts analysis" MIRANDA, Alfonso "The impact of the labour market on the timing of marriage and births in Spain" GUTIERREZ-DOMENECH, Maria "Blacks and the family cap: pregnancy, abortion, and spillovers" SABIA, Joseph J. "Technological progress, income inequality, and fertility" SATO, Yasuhiro TABATA, Ken YAMAMOTO, Kazuhiro "'Backslanted X' fertility dynamics and macroeconomics" MAOZ, Yishay D. "Biodiversity decline and population externalities" CHU, C.Y. Cyrus --- POVERTY "On the contribution of sectoral natural population growth to the aggregate poverty change" CHATTI, Rim EL LAGHA, AbdelRahman "Measuring the extent, depth, and severity of food insecurity: an application to American Indians in the USA" GUNDERSEN, Craig --- HEALTH "A longitudinal analysis of the impact of health shocks on the wealth of elders" LEE, Jinkook KIM, Hyungsoo "Does parents’ valuation of children’s health mimic their valuation of own health?" AGEE, Mark D. CROCKER, Thomas D. ----------------- Issue 2, 2008 --------------------- see above ----------------- Issue 3, 2008 --------------------- NOT YET PUBLISHED ----------------- Issue 4, 2008 --------------------- NOT YET PUBLISHED --------------------------- 4) About the JOURNAL OF POPULATION ECONOMICS --------------------------- The Journal of Population Economics is an international quarterly that publishes original theoretical and applied research and survey articles on topics dealing with broadly defined relationships between economic and demographic problems. Both extensive surveys of wider areas and shorter reviews of important new developments are considered. For more information please see: http://www.popecon.org --------------------------- 5) Editorial Board --------------------------- Editor-in-chief: KLAUS F.ZIMMERMANN, IZA, Bonn Fax: +49-228-3894210 / E-mail: zimmermann@iza.org Editors: JAMES ALBRECHT, Georgetown University, USA Fax: +1-202-6876102 / E-mail: albrecht@georgetown.edu ALESSANDRO CIGNO, University of Florence, Italy Fax: +39-055-472102 / E-mail: cigno@unifi.it DEBORAH COBB-CLARK, Australian National University, Australia Fax: +61-2-61250187 / Email: dcclark@coombs.anu.edu.au CHRISTIAN DUSTMANN, University College London, UK Fax: +44-20-79162775 / Email: c.dustmann@ucl.ac.uk JUNSEN ZHANG, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Fax: +852-26035805 / E-mail: jszhang@cuhk.edu.hk Associate Editors: PATRICIA APPS, University of Sydney, Australia ORLEY ASHENFELTER, Princeton University, USA KAUSHIK BASU, Cornell University, USA GERARD J. VAN DEN BERG, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands FRANCOIS BOURGUIGNON, World Bank, Washington, USA DAVID CARD, University of California, Berkeley, USA BARRY R. CHISWICK, University of Illinois at Chicago, USA HELMUT CREMER, GREMAQ and IDEI, Universitè de Toulouse, France GIL S. EPSTEIN, Bar-Ilan University, Israel JOHN F. ERMISCH, ISER, University of Essex, UK DENIS FOUGÈRE, CREST/INSEE, Paris, France ODED GALOR, Brown University, USA IRA N. GANG, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, USA DANIEL S. HAMERMESH, University of Texas at Austin, USA JAMES J. HECKMAN, University of Chicago, USA ARIE KAPTEYN, RAND, Santa Monica, USA KAI A. KONRAD, Science Center Berlin, Germany PETER KOOREMAN, Tilburg University, The Netherlands FRANCIS KRAMARZ, CREST/INSEE, France RONALD D. LEE, University of California, Berkeley, USA SHELLY LUNDBERG, University of Washington Seattle, USA LISA LYNCH, Tufts University, USA DAVID RIBAR, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, USA CHRISTOPH M. SCHMIDT, RWI Essen, Germany T. PAUL SCHULTZ, Yale University, New Haven, USA ----------------------------------------------------------- JOURNAL OF POPULATION ECONOMICS Office: Michael Vogler Journal of Population Economics c/o IZA Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 5-9 D-53113 Bonn Germany Fax: +49-228-3894 510 email: popecon@iza.org homepage: http://www.popecon.org ----------------------------------------------------------- |