email: popecon@iza.org
|
Search the Database
For copyright reasons we (Editorial Office) are
not able to send you copies of published papers. If you are interested in articles please contact
your local library, which might have the Journal of Population Economics.
 |
Furthermore, the publisher Springer offers several online services at "Springer Link", e.g. the download of articles, sample
copies and alerting services.
|
Detailed Information:
| Author(s): |
Walter H. Fisher, Christian Keuschnigg
|
| Title: |
Pension reform and labor market incentives
|
| Abstract: |
This paper investigates how parametric reform in a pay-as-you-go pension system with a tax–benefit link affects retirement and work incentives of prime-age workers. We find that postponed retirement tends to harm incentives of prime-age workers in the presence of a tax–benefit link, thereby creating a policy trade-off in stimulating aggregate labor supply. We show how several popular reform scenarios are geared either towards young or old workers or, indeed, both groups under appropriate conditions. We characterize the excess burden of pension insurance and show how it depends on the supply elasticities of both decision margins and the effective tax rates.
|
| Published: |
J Popul Econ (2010) 23 (2): 769-803
|
| Keywords: |
Pension reform - Retirement - Tax–benefit link
|
| Jel: |
H55 - J26
|
|
